I was reading something about modern browser behavior and it occurred to me that I hadn’t once looked at Matt’s Script Archive from the mid 1990s until now. I kind of like looking at old projects through the modern lens of hacking knowledge. What if we applied some of the modern day knowledge about web application security against 20-year-old tech? So I took at look at the web-board. According to Google there are still thousands of installs of WWWBoard lying around the web:
I was a little disappointed to see the following bit of text. It appears someone had beat me to the punch – 18 years ago!
# Changes based in part on information contained in BugTraq archives # message 'WWWBoard Vulnerability' posted by Samuel Sparling Nov-09-1998. # Also requires that each followup number is in fact a number, to # prevent message clobbering.
In taking a quick look there have been a number of vulns found in it over the years. Four CVEs in all. But I decided to take a look at the code anyway. Who knows – perhaps some vulnerabilities have been found but others haven’t. After all, this has been nearly 12 years since the last CVE was announced.
Sure enough its actually got some really vulnerable tidbits in it:
# Remove any NULL characters, Server Side Includes $value =~ s/ //g; $value =~ s/<!--(.|n)*-->//g;
The null removal is good, because there’s all kinds of ways to sneak things by Perl regex if you allow nulls. But that second string makes me shudder a bit. This code intentionally blocks typical SSI like:
<!--#exec cmd="ls -al" -->
But what if we break up the code? We’ve done this before for other things – like XSS where filters prevented parts of the exploit so you had to break it up into two chunks to be executed together once the page is re-assembled. But we’ve never (to my knowledge) talked about doing that for SSI! What if we slice it up into it’s required components where:
Subject is: <!--#exec cmd="ls -al" echo=' Body is: ' -->
That would effectively run SSI code. Full command execution! Thankfully SSI is all but dead these days not to mention Matt’s project is on it’s deathbed, so the real risk is negligible. Now let’s look a little lower:
$value =~ s/<([^>]|n)*>//g;
This attempts to block any XSS. Ironically it should also block SSI, but let’s not get into the specifics here too much. It suffers from a similar issue.
Body is: <img src="" onerror='alert("XSS");'
Unlike SSI I don’t have to worry about there being a closing comment tag – end angle brackets are a dime a dozen on any HTML page, which means that no matter what this persistent XSS will fire on the page in question. While not as good as full command execution, it does work on modern browser more reliably than SSI does on websites.
As I kept looking I found all kinds of other issues that would lead the board to get spammed like crazy, and in practice when I went hunting for the board on the Internet all I could find were either heavily modified boards that were password protected, or broken boards. That’s probably the only reason those thousands of boards aren’t fully compromised.
It’s an interesting reminder of exactly where we have come from and why things are so broken. We’ve inherited a lot of code, and even I still have snippets of Matt’s code buried in places all over the web in long forgotten but still functional code. We’ve inherited a lot of vulnerabilities and our knowledge has substantially increased. It’s really fascinating to see how bad things really were though, and how little security there really was when the web was in it’s infancy.