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WhiteHat Sentinel Update ::

September 2007 Edition ::

Welcome to the September 2007 edition of the WhiteHat Sentinel Service newsletter, designed to keep you up-to-date on the WhiteHat Sentinel Platform and changes in our website security testing activity.

New Site Improvements – Upgrade Scheduled for September 12, 5:00 PM PDT
The Sentinel Summary page has been improved with 3 new charts that render faster and provide a site overview at a glance. In order to bring you these new enhancements we will need to bring down the site for about an hour starting at 5:00 PM PDT.

These enhancements to the Sentinel Interface demonstrate our commitment to improving the customer experience and site usability. Please contact the WhiteHat Security Operations Team if you have questions.

WhiteHat Sentinel Update :: July 2007 Second Edition ::

Welcome to the second July 2007 edition of the WhiteHat Sentinel Service newsletter, designed to keep you up-to-date on the WhiteHat Sentinel Platform and changes in our website security testing activity.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service News
Last week featured not one, but two internal WhiteHat Security "Hackers Challenges" with some surprising results. It was quite intense. Congrats to the entire Security Operations Team. Jeremiah Grossman, Founder and CTO, blogged about the events here: Chasing Vulnerabilities for Fun and Profit III.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Updates
This week heralds the new release of the Sentinel Findings interface. This release was designed to enable you to work with and take action on your vulnerability data with increased speed and ease. New features include filters, sorting, aggregate grouping, easy readability, and asset valuation scores. We've also been working on this for some time, including performance tuning and optimization for various browsers to ensure the interface works in Internet Explorer as well as Firefox and Mozilla.

Sentinel will soon have some advanced conditional logic to enable us to identify vulnerabilities like Blind SQL Injection and attribute-based XSS injection much more effectively. Also very soon, WhiteHat will be able to describe inference-based attacks. For example if the timing of this response >= n-milliseconds, do X; else IF timing <= n-milliseconds, do Y then Z. This will greatly increase scanning intelligence and make decisions contextually based upon the current state of the website.

New Vulnerability Detection
Attribute-Based Cross-Site Scripting is one of the hardest types of Cross-Site Scripting to find in an automated fashion. Today, no desktop scanner does a good job at this; most don't even attempt it because false-positives skyrocket – except for the WhiteHat Sentinel Service. Naturally.

WhiteHat Sentinel implemented our second-generation attribute injections last week. Many of you have seen new XSS attack vectors being pushed on your sites, and for quite a few it is a result of these tests. The example we most often push is sourcing in JavaScript via an injected STYLE tag (attack vector for Internet Explorer).

Attribute injection is when user-controlled data lands inside of an HTML tag, or specifically a value inside of an HTML tag, where notorious characters like “<” and “>” may not be required for XSS exploitation. For example:

HTTP GET request (not actual Sentinel test - this is an example for exploitation):

https://www.domain.site/search/partner/index.cfm?
sessionid=12345678901&hid=%22%20STYLE=%22
background-image:%20expression(alert('Is_XSS_HERE?
))%22%22&search=stuff

Will result in this example tag in the HTTP Response:

<td>
<a xhref="/index.cfm?sessionid=1234567890&hid=" mce_href="/index.cfm?
sessionid=1234567890&hid=" STYLE="background-image:
expression(alert('XSS_right_here!'))""">
<img xsrc="https://ssl.image.site/www.customer.site/images/topnav/logo.gif"
mce_src="https://ssl.image.site/www.customer.site/images/topnav/logo.gif"
width="274"height="83" alt="Domain.site" border="0"></a>
</td>

This is a perfect example of an XSS vulnerability in which the attacker wouldn't need HTML tags or meta characters like <>. All you need in this case is a double-quote, a colon, and some parenthetics to begin your attack. From here the exploit can be carried out in many ways (e.g.-malicious Javascript). The ability to detect these issues accurately will grow exponentially with the advanced conditional logic currently being implemented into the Sentinel Service.

WhiteHat Sentinel New Service Tips
This is another friendly reminder: A significant benefit to WhiteHat Sentinel users is that the Service is continually adding new tests and improving old ones. This is a good thing. But, it will quite likely result in your finding new vulnerabilities in old code. Attribute-based XSS is a great example of this.

WhiteHat Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips
Q. How do I stop an XSS attack that lands in an HTML tag?
A. For most attribute-based attacks to work, the attacker needs at least single or double-quotes. Double-quotes are what is most often needed – from what we see at WhiteHat. You could try escaping, removing, or substituting single and double-quotes on input.

Alternately you could encode any user-supplied data safely on output. This is the safest approach. Barring international-language sites – there are a minimum of four alternate encoding types for all Latin-ASCII code page characters: being Unicode, Decimal, Hexadecimal, and Named. This can jump to 18 variants for something as simple as double-quote, if you factor in international-language code pages.

Q. How do I encode my output safely?
A. If you encode double-quotes as their named-entity references, you will remove most of your attribute XSS issues. If you encode single-quotes using Decimal (works across the most browsers) or named-entity reference, this should solve the problem, as well (by breaking the initial escape sequence the attacker needs to take over the tag and begin scripting).

A nice reference page for more on entity-encoding values can be found here:
http://www.crosswinds-cadre.net/?page=character_entities

Q. What is this Unicode craziness you speak of?
A. A great place to start is here: http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/Unicode.html

 

WhiteHat Sentinel Update - July 2007

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Updates

HTTP Response Splitting is a little known, very complex, and frequently misunderstood website vulnerability.

The best way to think about Response Splitting is that it’s executed similarly to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), but more powerful. Take a loose analogy of a written letter in an envelope. XSS targets the message inside the envelope, while Response Splitting targets not only the message inside the envelope, but the envelope itself.

There several different variations of Response Splitting and many emergent behaviors that make accurate vulnerability identification challenging. WhiteHat has been investing a lot of R&D time perfecting the accuracy of our tests and has started pushing the results to Sentinel users last week. WhiteHat Security plans to release a paper on this subject, breaking down the details of various conditions, implications, and how to measure them. In the meantime, the results of our testing contained a few surprises:

1. HTTP Response Splitting issues are far more widespread than expected.
Simply put: We’re finding it everywhere. The interesting thing about many Response Splitting vulnerabilities is that the Web application is not necessarily doing anything wrong compared to strict RFC specification. Though this doesn’t change the fact that the website is vulnerable to a malicious attacker taking control of it. Do not be surprised if we find this in a few places on your website(s).

2. HTTP Response Splitting issues are far more severe than expected.
HTTP Response Splitting issues can be very, very bad, especially on production sites if a caching server is present. If you are using an intermediary caching server/proxy/load-balancer there is a chance that one of several conditions could be true:

1. One-to-Many: One attack can target many users.
2. Persistence: HTTP Response Splitting attacks will be persistent.
3. Domino Effect: One vulnerability may be exploited to take over an entire site.

These issues only occur in very specific situations. We will actively notify you if we discover that those conditions are true. But, this can be tough to measure and we may not always know if the above worst case scenario conditions are possible. This evaluation may require some investigation on your end.

WhiteHat Sentinel New Service Tips

Don’t forget to schedule new scans if you temporarily stop your scan schedule. We have noticed some folks pause testing for a week or two to push new code, and then forget to resume scans (thus not testing their new code!).

WhiteHat is continually adding new tests and improving old ones in Sentinel. So, you will sometimes find new vulnerabilities in old code.

WhiteHat Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips

Q. How do I fix a vulnerability to HTTP Response Splitting?
A. Whew, tough question…you should likely take two approaches:

1. Input Validation: You can try to remove every CRLF (\r \n) from input. The problem you will have is that the CRLF is likely to be encoded in some fashion. It could simply be URI-escaped (%0d%0A) or some other Hex or Decimal encoding variant.

If you do not find all the encoded CRLF variants that your application is capable of decoding, you will still be vulnerable.

2. URI-escaping: If you properly escape the URI in every place it is output, like the HTTP Location Header, the CRLF will not be parsed by the browser.

The problem with this approach is that there are some conditions, like personalization cookies, that are not URI data but could be a Response-Splitting attack. We could take our personalization cookie that is name=WhiteHat and make that name=WhiteHat%0D%0A and craft our attack after that.

When your application goes to set that cookie with our name and subsequent attack, the HTTP Response Splitting attack will occur when it reaches the browser.

You would have to try and catch that on input validation, or write a special library to escape \r \n anywhere you found it in output that was potentially user-supplied data.

WhiteHat Sentinel Update - August 2007 Edition

Welcome to the August 2007 edition of the WhiteHat Sentinel Service newsletter, designed to keep you up-to-date on the WhiteHat Sentinel Platform and changes in our website security testing activity.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service News

HTTP Response Splitting results are in: http://www.whitehatsec.com/home/resources/newletters/update.html
http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/http_response_splitting.shtml

Many customers have asked us which Web servers are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting attacks. While we are still assembling aggregate totals, here is an initial list of server types we’ve observed to be vulnerable:

1. Apache/2.x
2. Apache/1.x
3. IBM_HTTP_SERVER
4. Jetty/5.1.11
5. Lotus-Domino
6. Microsoft-IIS/5.0
7. Microsoft-IIS/6.0 (commonly misconceived to be invulnerable.)
8. Netscape-Enterprise/4.1
9. Oracle-Application-Server-10g/Oracle-HTTP-Server
10. Resin/2.x
11. Websense Content Gateway (Traffic-Server/5.x)

Note that the problem of Response Splitting susceptibility is really with the application code. A common mistake is narrowly focusing on the server itself as the source of the issue, likely because a few servers have controls to strip this attack from HTTP GET requests. However, many of the HTTP RS attack vectors we’ve found use the HTTP POST verb as well.

The initial HTTP Response Splitting tests are not yet taking advantage of our more advanced testing engines that perform layered encoding attacks and malformed URI manipulations. Once this is fully incorporated, we expect to find even more variants than we do today.

Watch Out For...

User ID and Password mishandling: Using the user ID and password after logging the user in, as session or authorization identifiers, is a dangerous practice with many security implications. Not only does the presence of an XSS vulnerability indicate that you are giving up the user’s credentials very easily, but it often indicates weak session handling and leads to a variety of information-leakage issues, like passing the user ID and password off-domain via the HTTP Referer field or non-SSL encrypted parts of the website.

So, don’t use the user ID and password as identifiers.

While enhancing our authentication and automation tests, we have been observing more and more Web applications that pass the user ID and the password around in things like hidden form fields or cookies. Sometimes credentials are encoded, sometimes encrypted, and sometimes they are en claire (in plain sight).

While the actual security implications of this are contextual to the specific application, this design pattern usually indicates the presence of one or more weaknesses.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Enhancements

We are excited to announce many Sentinel platform enhancements focused on improving usability and manageability, including:

1. New “Findings” Interface: All columns are now sort-able. You can apply a variety of filter and sort mechanisms to organize your vulnerability data! For those of you with more than 20 sites in Sentinel, especially those of you with 50+ sites or 500+ vulnerabilities, this is a very powerful and more manageable way to review your findings. (ref: https://sentinel.whitehatsec.com/finding/finding.html)

2. Asset Valuation Functionality: Sentinel now allows you to assign a 1-10 numeric value to your assets. You can customize, prioritize, and sort findings more quickly. (ref: https://sentinel.whitehatsec.com/site/update.html?site_id=[your_site_id])

3. Credential Storing interface: You can now create, review, and update the credentials Sentinel uses to assess your sites at your discretion, directly through the interface. (ref: https://sentinel.whitehatsec.com/site/credentials.html?site=[your_site_id])

4. Mozilla Firefox Performance: Mozilla’s Firefox 1.x and 2.x browser performance times remain rock-solid with Sentinel. WhiteHat highly recommends this browser, especially considering the many security add-ons available. Additionally, you can re-create many Sentinel tests with Firefox that you cannot with Internet Explorer. Download Firefox today at www.getfirefox.com.

Coming Soon
Internet Explorer Response Fix: The August 16th release of Sentinel introduced rendering speed issues to Internet Explorer users.

Our #1 priority since identifying this has been the restoration of Sentinel's IE performance. A solution should be released within two weeks.

New Summary Graphs Page: In a few weeks, the overview graphs on the Summary pages of Sentinel will render faster and will be easier to understand at a glance.

The Vulnerabilities by Class Chart has been updated, and the old graphs will be been replaced with three charts that depict the following data:

1. Overall Rating: A bar graph that divides the number of vulnerabilities according to Severity, Threat, and Score.

2. Historical Severity Ratings: A line graph that shows the relative number of vulnerabilities at the different severity levels that have fluctuated in recent months.

3. Historical Threat Ratings: A line graph that plots the number of vulnerabilities at the different severity levels over the past several months (ref: https://sentinel.whitehatsec.com/).

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Tips

We will be adding user documentation and guidelines to the Sentinel interface very soon. In the meantime, we thought it would be helpful to share definitions for Sentinel terminology with you, starting with asset and vulnerability value terms:

Sentinel Service Terminology:

1. Priority: On a scale of 1 to 10, a customer-determined level of value or importance of a scanned site.
2. Severity: On a scale of 1 to 5, the potential business impact if a specific vulnerability is exploited.
3. Threat: On a scale of 1 to 5, a measure of feasibility in which a specific vulnerability can be exploited, based on the skill level required of the attacker, the context of the attack surface, the transience of the vulnerable code, and the prerequisites for access to the vulnerability.
4. Score: The sum total of the Threat and Severity levels of an identified vulnerability, plus the Priority of the affected site. Scores range from 3 to 20.

WhiteHat Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips

Q. What do I do if I see a user ID and password being passed around one of my applications?

A. First off – you need to identify why the credentials are being passed around in the application. If there is no reason, you can simply have your developers remove it.

Barring that, a common weakness we observe is the user ID and password being used as a form of session-token to maintain state in the application. This is a really bad idea on many levels. In addition to information leakage issues with the user credentials, this will introduce:

1. Session Fixation Weaknesses: The “session token” is predictable, fixed, and unchanging. This makes it a trivial task for an attacker to reverse-engineer and take over a “session.” (ref: http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/session_fixation.shtml)

2. A Vast Attack Surface: In general, there is no notion of a “session.” You cannot log a user “in” or “out” handling sessions in this fashion, since in this case, there is only “one” session for all eternity, making the attack surface very large once an attacker figures that out. Everything from XSS to CSRF becomes far, far worse if this weakness is present - not to mention the attacker can impersonate the user directly and at will (ref: http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/brute_force.shtml).

3. Multiple other issues from the WASC Threat Classification list. (ref: http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/)

Another common use is when credentials are checked before making security decisions such as verifying whether or not a transaction is really authorized by the user. Unfortunately, if the credentials are not entered by the user, but rather provided automatically via a hidden form field or cookies – the attacker can also force the user to submit these automatically.

WhiteHat Wants Your Feedback

Your feedback will help us improve WhiteHat’s customer service. Please drop us a line at support@whitehatsec.com and tell us what you think. We’re particularly interested in the following:

Q1: Do you currently use or have you ever used a Web Application Firewall (WAF). If so, which one?

Q2: If WhiteHat Sentinel could automatically provide custom WAF rules to immediately prevent the exploitation of identified vulnerabilities – would this be of value to you?

Q3: If so, how important would this service be to you?

 

WhiteHat Sentinel Update - July 2007 Second Edition

Welcome to the second July 2007 edition of the WhiteHat Sentinel Service newsletter, designed to keep you up-to-date on the WhiteHat Sentinel Platform and changes in our website security testing activity.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service News
Last week featured not one, but two internal WhiteHat Security "Hackers Challenges" with some surprising results. It was quite intense. Congrats to the entire Security Operations Team. Jeremiah Grossman, Founder and CTO, blogged about the events here: Chasing Vulnerabilities for Fun and Profit III.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Updates
This week heralds the new release of the Sentinel Findings interface. This release was designed to enable you to work with and take action on your vulnerability data with increased speed and ease. New features include filters, sorting, aggregate grouping, easy readability, and asset valuation scores. We've also been working on this for some time, including performance tuning and optimization for various browsers to ensure the interface works in Internet Explorer as well as Firefox and Mozilla.

Sentinel will soon have some advanced conditional logic to enable us to identify vulnerabilities like Blind SQL Injection and attribute-based XSS injection much more effectively. Also very soon, WhiteHat will be able to describe inference-based attacks. For example if the timing of this response >= n-milliseconds, do X; else IF timing <= n-milliseconds, do Y then Z. This will greatly increase scanning intelligence and make decisions contextually based upon the current state of the website.

New Vulnerability Detection
Attribute-Based Cross-Site Scripting is one of the hardest types of Cross-Site Scripting to find in an automated fashion. Today, no desktop scanner does a good job at this; most don't even attempt it because false-positives skyrocket – except for the WhiteHat Sentinel Service. Naturally.

WhiteHat Sentinel implemented our second-generation attribute injections last week. Many of you have seen new XSS attack vectors being pushed on your sites, and for quite a few it is a result of these tests. The example we most often push is sourcing in JavaScript via an injected STYLE tag (attack vector for Internet Explorer).

Attribute injection is when user-controlled data lands inside of an HTML tag, or specifically a value inside of an HTML tag, where notorious characters like “<” and “>” may not be required for XSS exploitation. For example:

HTTP GET request (not actual Sentinel test - this is an example for exploitation):

https://www.domain.site/search/partner/index.cfm?
sessionid=12345678901&hid=%22%20STYLE=%22
background-image:%20expression(alert('Is_XSS_HERE?
))%22%22&search=stuff

Will result in this example tag in the HTTP Response:

<td>
<a xhref="/index.cfm?sessionid=1234567890&hid=" mce_href="/index.cfm?
sessionid=1234567890&hid=" STYLE="background-image:
expression(alert('XSS_right_here!'))""">
<img xsrc="https://ssl.image.site/www.customer.site/images/topnav/logo.gif"
mce_src="https://ssl.image.site/www.customer.site/images/topnav/logo.gif"
width="274"height="83" alt="Domain.site" border="0"></a>
</td>

This is a perfect example of an XSS vulnerability in which the attacker wouldn't need HTML tags or meta characters like <>. All you need in this case is a double-quote, a colon, and some parenthetics to begin your attack. From here the exploit can be carried out in many ways (e.g.-malicious Javascript). The ability to detect these issues accurately will grow exponentially with the advanced conditional logic currently being implemented into the Sentinel Service.

WhiteHat Sentinel New Service Tips
This is another friendly reminder: A significant benefit to WhiteHat Sentinel users is that the Service is continually adding new tests and improving old ones. This is a good thing. But, it will quite likely result in your finding new vulnerabilities in old code. Attribute-based XSS is a great example of this.

WhiteHat Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips
Q. How do I stop an XSS attack that lands in an HTML tag?
A. For most attribute-based attacks to work, the attacker needs at least single or double-quotes. Double-quotes are what is most often needed – from what we see at WhiteHat. You could try escaping, removing, or substituting single and double-quotes on input.

Alternately you could encode any user-supplied data safely on output. This is the safest approach. Barring international-language sites – there are a minimum of four alternate encoding types for all Latin-ASCII code page characters: being Unicode, Decimal, Hexadecimal, and Named. This can jump to 18 variants for something as simple as double-quote, if you factor in international-language code pages.

Q. How do I encode my output safely?
A. If you encode double-quotes as their named-entity references, you will remove most of your attribute XSS issues. If you encode single-quotes using Decimal (works across the most browsers) or named-entity reference, this should solve the problem, as well (by breaking the initial escape sequence the attacker needs to take over the tag and begin scripting).

A nice reference page for more on entity-encoding values can be found here:
http://www.crosswinds-cadre.net/?page=character_entities

Q. What is this Unicode craziness you speak of?
A. A great place to start is here: http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/Unicode.html


WhiteHat Sentinel Update :: July 2007

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Updates

HTTP Response Splitting is a little known, very complex, and frequently misunderstood website vulnerability.

The best way to think about Response Splitting is that it’s executed similarly to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), but more powerful. Take a loose analogy of a written letter in an envelope. XSS targets the message inside the envelope, while Response Splitting targets not only the message inside the envelope, but the envelope itself.

There several different variations of Response Splitting and many emergent behaviors that make accurate vulnerability identification challenging. WhiteHat has been investing a lot of R&D time perfecting the accuracy of our tests and has started pushing the results to Sentinel users last week. WhiteHat Security plans to release a paper on this subject, breaking down the details of various conditions, implications, and how to measure them. In the meantime, the results of our testing contained a few surprises:

1. HTTP Response Splitting issues are far more widespread than expected.
Simply put: We’re finding it everywhere. The interesting thing about many Response Splitting vulnerabilities is that the Web application is not necessarily doing anything wrong compared to strict RFC specification. Though this doesn’t change the fact that the website is vulnerable to a malicious attacker taking control of it. Do not be surprised if we find this in a few places on your website(s).

2. HTTP Response Splitting issues are far more severe than expected.
HTTP Response Splitting issues can be very, very bad, especially on production sites if a caching server is present. If you are using an intermediary caching server/proxy/load-balancer there is a chance that one of several conditions could be true:

1. One-to-Many: One attack can target many users.
2. Persistence: HTTP Response Splitting attacks will be persistent.
3. Domino Effect: One vulnerability may be exploited to take over an entire site.

These issues only occur in very specific situations. We will actively notify you if we discover that those conditions are true. But, this can be tough to measure and we may not always know if the above worst case scenario conditions are possible. This evaluation may require some investigation on your end.

WhiteHat Sentinel New Service Tips
Don’t forget to schedule new scans if you temporarily stop your scan schedule. We have noticed some folks pause testing for a week or two to push new code, and then forget to resume scans (thus not testing their new code!).

WhiteHat is continually adding new tests and improving old ones in Sentinel. So, you will sometimes find new vulnerabilities in old code.

WhiteHat Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips

Q. How do I fix a vulnerability to HTTP Response Splitting?
A. Whew, tough question…you should likely take two approaches:

1. Input Validation: You can try to remove every CRLF (\r \n) from input. The problem you will have is that the CRLF is likely to be encoded in some fashion. It could simply be URI-escaped (%0d%0A) or some other Hex or Decimal encoding variant.

If you do not find all the encoded CRLF variants that your application is capable of decoding, you will still be vulnerable.

2. URI-escaping: If you properly escape the URI in every place it is output, like the HTTP Location Header, the CRLF will not be parsed by the browser.

The problem with this approach is that there are some conditions, like personalization cookies, that are not URI data but could be a Response-Splitting attack. We could take our personalization cookie that is name=WhiteHat and make that name=WhiteHat%0D%0A and craft our attack after that.

When your application goes to set that cookie with our name and subsequent attack, the HTTP Response Splitting attack will occur when it reaches the browser.

You would have to try and catch that on input validation, or write a special library to escape \r \n anywhere you found it in output that was potentially user-supplied data.

WhiteHat Sentinel Update :: April 2007 ::

Welcome to the WhiteHat Sentinel Service update, the first in an ongoing series designed to keep you informed of updates to the WhiteHat Sentinel Platform, as well as changes to our website vulnerability testing activity.

New Sentinel Service Alerts
WhiteHat is implementing new cross-site scripting (XSS) attack vectors in Sentinel this week, employing both alternate tags and directives, and utilizing filter evasion techniques. If you rely on the Microsoft .NET http.request.validator object to blacklist bad input, you may find yourself vulnerable to a few of these new attack vectors.

While we are continually implementing new tests into the Sentinel framework, these particular tests may find XSS in applications previously thought secure to XSS attacks. So, we wanted to provide advance notice of this possibility. In general, there will be times, as we implement new security tests, that we will find new vulnerabilities in old, stable code in your web applications.

WhiteHat Sentinel Service Feature Updates
1. Sentinel 3.0.4(5) was released Monday April 9th, 2007. You will notice many subtle enhancements to the interface for improved usability.

2. Sentinel 3.1 release is getting closer. This release contains the much-anticipated new “Findings” tab with powerful options to filter and sort vulnerability information to make delegation and remediation of vulnerabilities more granular; this is especially useful for large, highly distributed organizations. There are also more comprehensive messages communicating the status of actions like vulnerability retest requests.

3. The Sentinel PDF report engine is currently being re-written. We have listened to your requests and are adjusting print reporting options to provide better detail on test activities and vulnerability locations.

WhiteHat Sentinel New Service Tip
Does a member of your organization, developer or otherwise, need more detail than is available in the Sentinel PDF report? Why not issue them a Sentinel account? Sentinel accounts are free with the service, and allow users to dig into test details and the automated retesting engine via our Web UI. (By the way, the interactive retesting engine is one of Sentinel’s most powerful features.)

Have your authorized organizational contact email support@whitehatsec.com today, and we will create the accounts you need so your developers can work more closely with Sentinel’s security test details and utilize the real-time verification ability.

WhiteHat Security Website Vulnerability Management Practice Tips
1. Properly encoding your output is essential to the safety of your Web applications. While many people focus on validating input and filtering output, encoding meta characters in a manner safe for the browser user agent is the key component to defeating script injection attacks in a multi-application enterprise.

2. Since there are not many good encoding libraries out there for most common Web application frameworks, we recommend that you create your own. Microsoft’s ACE Team has a great one for reference:

http://blogs.msdn.com/ace_team/archive/2006/11/20/microsoft-anti-cross-site-
scripting-library-v1-5-is-done.aspx
Reflector is a nice class browser for looking at how your existing .NET request.validator works, or evaluating the new anti-XSS library. Make sure you review your EULA to see if you have rights to view managed code, or if it is considered “reverse engineering” and disallowed.

http://www.aisto.com/roeder/dotnet/
If you have to create your own encoding library, the above is a great place to start. OWASP.org has some Java-based encoding libraries for reference as well.

 

The data contained within this report is completely different than the reports distributed by Symantec, Mitre (CVE), IBM (ISS) X-Force, and others. These organizations track publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in commercial and open source software products, which often contain Web application flaws as well. WhiteHat’s data is different because it focuses solely on previously unknown vulnerabilities in custom web applications, code unique to that organization, on real-world websites Also, the websites managed under WhiteHat Sentinel are likely represent the most “important” and “secure” websites found on the Web, conducting high-volume transactions and managing sensitive information. This context is helpful when estimating the current global state of website security.

 

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